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ON THE COVER

Our cover features an intelligence professional working on current reporting and analysis operations. Many thanks to our II0 students who are active and retired military, and IC-affiliated members who work every day to not only work tirelessly in their academic studies but also work to ensure our national security. Photo: Pexels
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Greetings students.

This month, instead of providing you with bookmarks, I would like to provide you access to my “start.me” page. Under the “Defense and Intelligence” column in the middle of the page, I keep a constantly updated, alphabetized list of intelligence-related websites. If you know one is not on the list, please don’t hesitate to send me the information and I will add it. Here is the link, enjoy! https://start.me/p/z4bplk/startpage

If you have any questions or just want to talk, please do not hesitate to reach out! I hope you all have a wonderful summer!

Pat Tortorici
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Dual-use technologies (industry, university, government, or military-created tools, products, and technologies with more than one functional application) are a largely debated topic in the community. Common technologies like the Internet, Global Positioning System (GPS), digital cameras, communication satellites, and other technologies have largely shaped how we navigate our lives today. Dual-use technologies pose some national security challenges as we create new and innovative products within the race for global technological superiority. Some competing nations already have access to U.S. patented technologies and develop replicas for their respective national interests. Iran, for example, has nuclear fissile materials that are used for energy purposes, but Iran also can develop nuclear weapons if enough nuclear material is enriched. As such, monitoring the development of dual-use technologies is imperative to ensure these technologies do not undermine U.S. national security.

Currently, the U.S. State Department facilitates the surveillance and transparency of export controls for dual-use technologies through the Wassenaar Arrangement – a collective body of nation-states gathered to mitigate or alleviate attempts of dual-use technologies getting into the wrong hands. Leaders in government, industry, and academic research development must continue to balance the benefits of innovation while ensuring there are robust security regulations and avenues for strong collaborative research and added investments to identify emerging domestic and foreign threats.
"""MGQDL DGL EZHBJ CE TRQGQ ADLCGQ QAXJ."

-Marc Chagall, Modernist artist
Will China invade Taiwan in the near term?

by Sam Stroud and Craig Nazareth
Will China invade Taiwan in the near term? Several factors indicate that “...the window for conflict is now open, with that window most likely remaining open between 2024-2028,” (Global Guardian, 2024, link). Military analysts envision the People’s Republic of China targeting a 2030 timeframe for an invasion of Taiwan (DoD, 2024, link). We agree that the China-Taiwan crisis is currently at a boiling point, and assess with high confidence that the PRC may attempt to annex Taiwan through the forceful occupation of Taiwan and removal of the Republic of China’s government before 2030 if certain strategic milestones are achieved as part of President Xi Jinping’s National Rejuvenation goals. We contend that although the PRC is not currently positioned to annex Taiwan through military means, there is no diplomatic solution that would appease Beijing’s political ends concerning Taiwan. Instead, the PRC will focus its efforts in the next three years on shaping the strategic and operational environment to create conditions favorable for reunification by “…all measures necessary,” (Chinese Embassy, 2022, link) which involves securing economic independence to shield itself from US-led economic warfare, instigating regional instability to achieve reunification under their terms, and attempting to delegitimize Taiwan’s claim of independence to prevent US intervention. **Whether the PRC pursues such an overt military solution depends on how successful Beijing is in coercing the ROC government and the Taiwanese people through all means necessary, (overt, clandestine and covert activities) for the purposes of destabilizing Taiwan’s government, sowing political ambiguity among US-aligned regional partners, and creating a justified opportunity for invasion.**

Envisioning this plausible future, we employed structured analytical techniques, which are analytical approaches presented in the seminal work by Richards Heuer and Randolph H. Pherson titled *Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis*. They underscore that objective analysis and mitigation of cognitive bias requires a rigorous evaluation of assumptions and critical thinking informed by the application of structured thinking and analysis. We leveraged the “Analysis of Competing Hypotheses” technique to develop and evaluate hypotheses based on our research of credible sources. We also employed Heuer and Pherson’s “Key Assumptions Check” which identified several assumptions predicated upon both current and historical information on the subject. We then examined the myriad factors that play into Beijing’s strategic calculus for pursuing its national interests with respect to Taiwan. Lastly, we considered alternative viewpoints, as the United States’ Office of the Director of National Intelligence requires for all finished intelligence products concerning complex, ambiguous security issues (Intelligence Community Directive 203, 2022, link).

**Key Judgment #1: Taipei and Taiwanese Perspective**

We judge that the current disposition of the Republic of China (ROC), its leadership, and its people is antagonistic towards effective diplomatic solutions with the PRC, and neither Beijing nor Taipei are willing to unify under the other’s political ideology or government. This is also reinforced by the resurging Taiwanese identity as “Taiwanese” and not “Chinese” (BBC, link), and the election of former Democratic Progressive Party Vice-President, Lai Ching-te, whose political views heavily advocate for Taiwanese independence.

**Key Judgment #2: Beijing’s Perspective**

Beijing’s unspoken view is that the aforementioned political stalemate leaves few options besides military incursion or invasion for achieving their unification goals. We judge that Beijing’s strategic calculus for a military invasion of Taiwan is predicated on two things: their confidence to secure a political victory prior to significant foreign military intervention, and their ability to swiftly exploit Taiwan’s economic strength. In our view, neither of these two conditions seem feasible at this time.
for the following reasons:

A critical objective of the PRC is to diminish the US and its allies’ ability to intercede on Taiwan’s behalf if Beijing pursues more coercive actions. Gray zone activities allow Beijing plausible deniability which hinders the U.S. and allies’ ability to militarily intervene decisively to prevent Beijing from achieving its reunification goals. Beijing has not made any significant gains from its gray zone activities but will escalate these activities as Beijing’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) achieves its modernization goals.

Another critical limiting factor for the PRC is its dependence on global free trade in the Taiwan Strait. The PRC’s efforts to establish legitimate economic alternatives through global partnerships may provide the PRC with a level of protection from economic and financial warfare if they were to pursue a coercive solution entailing a limited military conflict or war.

A Deeper Look

In his 2024 New Year’s address, President Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), stated that “China will surely be reunified, and all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should be bound by a common sense of purpose and share in the glory of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China [MFAPRC], 2023b). We view these statements as a veiled threat, one revealing Beijing’s intent to position itself for a successful annexation of Taiwan before 2030.

Xi’s statement reinforces Beijing’s commitment to replace or overthrow the Taiwanese Republic of China (ROC) government. We judge that annexation would be the swiftest approach but is currently an option that yields an existential risk to the PRC due to the threat of intervention by the international community. Beijing views Taiwan as an “inalienable part of China’s territory,” maintaining a position that the PRC is “the sole legal government representing the whole of China” (MFAPRC, 2022). We believe the ROC government’s increasing vie for independence, coupled with Taiwan’s significant economic prosperity (Kao & Hung, 2024) in the face of China’s economic downturn (Stevenson-Yang et al, 2024), are the largest factors in the PRC’s heightened national interest in seizing Taiwan for itself.

A strong indication of this is the PRC’s renewed vigor in signaling their intentions to annex Taiwan, which is stronger now than it has ever been before. In various official PRC communications from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we receive two distinct messages. First, that the PRC will obtain Taiwan through any means necessary (MFAPRC, 2024b), and second, that the PRC understands and respects the importance of resolving this matter diplomatically (MFAPRC, 2023a). However, the PRC, the Taiwanese Republic of China (ROC), the US, and other regional nations are concurrently increasing their military presence within the Taiwan Strait (Garamone, 2023), and actors on both sides of the conflict are urging the need for violent confrontation to resolve the matter (Moriyasu, 2023; MFAPRC, 2024c).
The prospect of diplomatic resolution is further complicated by factors such as the ROC’s hardline stance on remaining independent (International Crisis Group, 2023), as well as vested economic interests by foreign nations, such as the US, in maintaining the status quo.

The two major military actors in the crisis are the PRC and the US, with the US increasing its military activities in the strait in direct response to PRC escalations (Funaiole, Hart, & Bermude, 2023; Garamone, 2023). The US’s official stance for the continuance of the status quo (Taiwan Relations Act, 1979), as well as the US’s reluctance to engage in military conflict without support and approval from its regional partners, gives the PRC the initiative in this situation and leaves all other nations reactive to the PRC’s decisions. The PRC’s current disposition indicates how they are posturing to guarantee their ability to annex Taiwan. We judge that the PRC plans to achieve four strategic objectives in their pursuit of their desired end state with respect to Taiwan.

**Beijing’s Strategic Objective #1: Establish Legitimacy**

The first of the four strategic objectives that the PRC will pursue within the next three years is a political position that will grant them indemnity, or even justification, for a military incursion into Taiwan (International Crisis Group, 2023). The ROC’s current political perspective is inherently incompatible with the possibility of diplomatic resolution with the PRC, as Stephen Hartnett recounts that “even as Tsai [ROC President] maintained the nation’s independence from China, her 2016 “Double Ten” Day speech marking Taiwan’s independence echoed the fantasy that Taiwan is the real China” (2021). The notion that Taiwan is the “real China” is not only antagonistic but is one that directly contests the legitimacy of the PRC’s rule over China, leaving the PRC with few options beyond invasion. Furthermore, a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center polled the Taiwanese public on their national identity and found that 67% of the populace identifies as “Taiwanese” (Huang & Starr, 2024), with Maizland’s analysis indicating that Taiwanese public opinion overwhelmingly supports maintaining the status quo (2024). This diplomatic impasse is precisely why the PRC will seek a position of indemnity or justification for an invasion and will do so with the intent of keeping the US and its regional allies from intervening in the conflict.

**Beijing’s Strategic Objective #2: Subvert or Degrade Pro-Taiwan Allied Intercession**

The second strategic objective the PRC will pursue is the subversion of the US and its allies’ ability to intercede on Taiwan’s behalf. As previously mentioned, a determining factor for the level of US military involvement in a conflict with the PRC is the disposition of the US’s regional allied nations on the matter. The threat of US-led military involvement is likely the single largest factor preventing an invasion today and is a critical blocker the PRC must overcome (Amonson & Egli, 2023).
Currently, both South Korea and Australia maintain a position of neutrality on the matter, with South Korea likely concerned with the threat of North Korean incursion at the behest of the PRC should they intervene on Taiwan’s behalf (Lee, 2023). Australia’s official position of neutrality is offset by members of its leadership, such as Defense Minister Peter Dutton stating, “it was ‘inconceivable’ that Australia would not support the United States in any conflict with China over Taiwan” (McGregor, 2023). There is a high likelihood that the PRC is aware of this factor, and the neutrality of Taiwan’s neighbors puts the impetus on the PRC to establish its legitimacy in an invasion, which leads to the third strategic objective the PRC will pursue.

Beijing’s Strategic Objective #3: Gray Zone Activities to Gain Initiative

The PRC will escalate asymmetric overt, clandestine, and covert methods to destabilize the region in an attempt to damage the ROC’s relationships with its neighbors, as well as delegitimize its political position. Viable strategies for achieving this objective range from provoking Taiwan to first action (International Crisis Group, 2023), gaining regional solidarity on the idea that Taiwan’s potential independence is the cause of regional instability (Amonson & Egli, 2023), or effectively coercing regional neighbors into denouncing the current status-quo (Maizland, 2024). Conducting such activities may not only lead to their intended goal of subverting third-party intervention but could potentially offer the PRC a justified opportunity for invasion. Opposite of South Korea, Japan has been particularly party intervention but could potentially offer the PRC a justified opportunity for invasion. Opposite of South Korea, Japan has been particularly antagonistic; encouraging the ROC to escalate violence with the PRC as a means to show strength and resolve (Moriyasu, 2023), however such actions could very well lead to a justified opportunity for PRC invasion if the ROC were to unnecessarily instigate overt aggression without the approval of its allies. Beijing has already demonstrated its willingness to rapidly escalate activities in response to a(claimed security threat to its borders in 2024 when it deployed security forces over a fishing vessel skirmish in Taiwanese waters (BBC, 2024, [link]).

Beijing’s Strategic Objective #4: Economic Independence

Beijing is dealing with a deteriorating economy in the post-COVID environment, which limits Beijing’s short-term military options. China’s unstable property market, massive debt accumulation, and uncontrollable global factors such as the disruption of the primary shipping route from Asia to Europe via the Red Sea Crisis (Reuters, 2024), combined with the PRC’s focus on national security modernization and expansion (DOD, 2023) has become a costly one and is beleaguered by mostly negative economic futures. As the world witnessed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the US’s most likely response to an unsupported invasion of Taiwan will be crippling sanctions and other methods of economic and financial warfare wielded to its fullest against the PRC (International Crisis Group, 2023). As such, the final strategic objective the PRC will pursue is the maturation of economic independence from the current global free trade model. The PRC’s first expected outcome is a degree of protection from the threat of US-led economic warfare, which given its current state of economic instability, is a critical factor in its feasibility for annexing Taiwan. This outcome requires the maturity of the PRC’s past alternative economic initiatives, such as its vast Belt and Road Initiative, to yield a return on investment Brands, 2023; MFAPRC, 2024a; MFAPRC, 2024b).

The PRC’s vast effort to develop diplomatic and economic relationships with nations across the globe is their answer to this problem of economic dependence. The wide-reaching Belt and Road Initiative offers the PRC an expansive logistical network outside of
the US’s influence and provides new trade opportunities that could potentially lessen the PRC’s economic dependence on the status quo significantly (Yoshihara, 2023; Vest, Kratz, & Goujon, 2022). As such, within the next three years, the PRC will likely seek maturity on these pre-existing relationships and expansion to new partnerships (Ellis, 2024), hoping to establish new bulk sources for the import and export of materials and supplies. A significant enough return on investment from these relationships may yield enough economic independence to improve the PRC’s strategic options if they elected to annex Taiwan, allowing the PRC to weather the extended economic impacts of US-led economic warfare, as well as survive the next significant economic threat: trade disruptions in the Taiwan Strait.

The next critical factor the PRC must mitigate in an invasion of Taiwan is the crippling repercussions that stem from both the disruption of Taiwan’s microchip manufacturing and the damage military conflict would have on global free trade within the Taiwan Strait (Maizland, 2024; Vest, Kratz, & Goujon, 2022; Yoshihara, 2023). Taiwan currently manufactures roughly 90% of the world’s most advanced microchips and accounts for 60% of all microchip purchases made by the PRC (Maizland, 2023). This is further compounded by the importance of keeping the Taiwan Strait open and safe due to its role as a shipping lane critical to global free trade, given that roughly 80% of all Indo-Pacific trade travels through it (Yoshihara, 2023; Vest, Kratz, & Goujon, 2022). The PRC’s heavy economic dependence on both trade with Taiwan for microchips and the continuance of free trade through the Taiwan Strait is a double-edged sword for the PRC in an invasion scenario (MFAPRC, 2024c). On one hand, the PRC may seize Taiwan’s robust semiconductor manufacture and control of the Taiwan Strait trade corridor for itself, but this comes at the increased risk of US military intervention if done without accomplishing the aforementioned strategic objectives. On the other hand, even with the accomplishment of the prior objectives, the US will still retain the power to deny the PRC the ability to leverage the newly captured Taiwanese economy within the free trade apparatus via economic warfare; hence the need for economic independence.

Both US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and PRC President Xi Jinping have been definitive in their comments about the interdependence of the US and PRC economic systems (Blinken, 2023; MFAPRC, 2023b). The economic effects created by an invasion of Taiwan by the PRC will extend globally, significantly impacting the US as well. The US’s immediate response will likely be the heaviest of economic and financial impositions possible in hopes for deterrence, but the PRC’s pursuit of economic alternatives may provide them enough shielding to obtain a decisive military victory in Taiwan, pending the PRC has obtained enough strategic military advantages (Amonson & Egli, 2023).

Deputy Secretary Blinken Meets With Admiral Sun Jianguo
Photo: U.S. Department of State (Public Domain)

Considering Alternative Views

One prominent objection to our forecast is the rejection of the idea that the PRC would be willing to risk escalating gray zone activities for destabilization, as the embarrassment of being exposed to orchestrating such events could potentially undermine other opportunities for annexing Taiwan. To that point, we reply that these activities are a key
component of PRC strategy, which emphasizes information warfare and cyber operations (Brands, 2023; Garamone, 2023), and an escalation of these activities seems highly probable given their escalations of other DIME-related coercive activities. Our analysis accounts for the unique constraints the PRC must currently overcome to achieve a politically and militarily opportune window for invasion, and we judge that the situation must become significantly more unstable for them to gain advantages over these constraints. We assess that the use of asymmetric warfare and covert activities offers the PRC the highest probability of success in achieving the desired level of instability. As for public embarrassment, the PRC will simply deny any complicity or responsibility in these actions, and coordinate with other actors to conduct them (Brands, 2023; MFAPRC, 2024c).

Another prominent objection is the feasibility that the PRC will risk retaliation to embrace the element of surprise to invade Taiwan unexpectedly (Amonson & Egli, 2023). The PRC may do this under the belief that the US will not act in time, or at all. Our response is that we simply cannot know the intrinsic value that President Xi Jinping or the PRC may have for an invasion, nor are we able to properly account for the lengths or sacrifices they are willing to commit to in service of those values. The current indeterminate stances of the US and Taiwan’s regional allies could very well make for an effective opportunity to attempt this strategy within the next three years (Amonson & Egli, 2023). However, we expect that the cost levied upon the PRC by the global community will be incredibly significant, even if no military actions are conducted against the PRC in response (Vest, Kratz, & Goujon, 2022).

Conclusion

The PRC has expressed, quite effectively, their intentions to see Taiwan “reunified” with the rest of China through any means necessary. Despite ongoing diplomatic exchanges with both the PRC, ROC, and the US, the likelihood of a diplomatic resolution appears slim given both the PRC’s and the ROC’s firm political standing on the legitimacy of the other. Despite this apparent diplomatic impasse and situational volatility, the PRC maintains its firm commitment to this national interest; however, the PRC lacks the strategic conditions needed to act on this national interest currently. Beijing will maintain its focus on coercive escalations short of military conflict while its diplomatic and economic initiatives, and gray zone security activities set conditions for more overt activities that solidify their political aim to subsume Taiwan into China by 2030. The PRC will concurrently plan, orchestrate, and conduct overt, clandestine, and covert activities designed to “shape” the strategic and operational environment over the next three years while simultaneously degrading the US and the US’ allies’ ability to intervene. If left unchecked, the PRC’s pursuit of its strategic objectives will pose a grave national security risk, especially as it pertains to the US diplomatic, military, and economic interests with Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait.

Special thanks to Sam Stroud for his outstanding student article as a contribution to the Dead Drop! We encourage IIO students to participate and share their unique talents and perspectives on emerging topics in the IC.

Are you an IIO student, and want to submit an article to be featured in the Dead Drop? Contact your professor for instructions.
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"Beyond Deepfakes: Synthetic Moving Images and the Future of History" by Williams Cole, an accomplished Information Warfare certificate student, is a seminal work featured in the prestigious Journal of Information Warfare. This article examines the burgeoning challenges and ethical considerations posed by the advent of generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the creation of synthetic moving images. Cole's analysis is particularly insightful in the context of online disinformation campaigns and their potential to dramatically alter the preservation and interpretation of historical footage archives. He articulates how AI-manipulated content, notably moving images, transcends the traditional boundaries of Information Warfare (IW), venturing into the uncharted territory of visual historical records with possibly far-reaching consequences.

A special shout out is warranted for Professor Joe Giordano, whose expertise and guidance in the field of Information Warfare have been instrumental not only to Williams's achievements but have also enlightened many in the community. As the professor of CYBV 450 Information Warfare, Professor Giordano provides an in-depth overview of the tactics, techniques, procedures, and tools essential for conducting and defending against Information Operation campaigns. It's educators like Professor Giordano who arm future leaders with the knowledge and ethics required to navigate the intricate digital world, ensuring they are well-equipped to face the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead in shaping a truthful historical discourse.
The Discoverer Weather System, also known as “Corona” (commissioned 1959-1972) makes its mark in technological history as the first imagery and reconnaissance satellite. It revolutionized the field of U.S. meteorology, counterintelligence, and intelligence collection of Soviet targets during the Cold War era. Launched and fielded in the late 1950s through a joint effort by the U.S. Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Corona satellites were initially developed to provide reconnaissance activities for various strategic and operational missions. Corona’s unique capabilities to collect valuable weather forecasting data (cloud cover, temperature, barometric, and atmospheric conditions), was revered as a critical element to strategic mission planning. Lessons learned from the Corona Discoverer Weather System satellite represent the critical intersections of technology, scientific advancement, and national security interests. Today, Corona satellite imagery has been declassified and is available to the public.
In INTV 350, Collection Operations, students gain an appreciation of the technical nature of collecting information that answers intelligence requirements. This is particularly the case for remote sensing, which requires numerous experts in collection management, satellite operations, aviation, and sensor capabilities to offer their expertise to the intelligence collection disciplines. This is not only true for Geospatial Intelligence but also signals intelligence, or SIGINT, and measurement and signature intelligence, also called MASINT.

Remote sensing is a term typically applied to sensors on satellites that are orbiting the Earth in various ways to address a specific intelligence need. An orbit is a curved path that an object in space, such as a star, planet, moon, asteroid, or spacecraft, takes around another object due to gravity, according to the European Space Agency.

Intelligence sensors onboard satellites serve various purposes- to collect imagery, to collect signatures of targets of interest, or to simply relay data from points on the Earth and in space. All sensors are highly calibrated and designed to persist in space for many years while being employed for their collection mission. This is mainly because satellites remain at vast distances from their imaging target. Some satellites are traveling more than 35,000 kilometers from Earth and can image vast regions of the Earth throughout their orbit. An understanding of the intelligence requirement is needed to plan the appropriate satellite sensor and orbit. Various remote sensing solutions could help us address our intelligence needs in terms of optimized orbit and sensor pairing for the collection mission.

Observing the Earth's rotation can reveal some basic considerations for remote sensing. Our view from space reveals a clear difference in how light falls upon the face of the Earth at any given time. Some places are in darkness while other places on Earth are illuminated based on the time of day. This basic fact will impact how intelligence sensors are deployed. Imaging sensors that rely on the passive collection of light would need to
The top demands for remote sensing include the ability of sensors to image the Earth and space, intercept signals of interest, and provide early warning detection from within 100 kilometers above ground to vast heights above the Earth. One high-demand requirement is to be able to do these things with 24/7 coverage of a region of the Earth and space. Another requirement is to be able to provide high-resolution imagery of specific points on the Earth and space, or wide area coverage of the Earth and space. So the intelligence need is based on either duration over a target area or the resolution and coverage needed of a target or target area.

To meet intelligence demands across so many challenging missions, satellites can be deployed in various orbits that optimize their information collection mission. Satellites orbit the Earth in ways that optimize their ability to collect certain features about the Earth or collect information about objects or activities on the Earth. Depending on the collection mission assigned, some satellites are required to move faster or slower or orbit the Earth at higher or lower orbits. Others are required to orbit in sync with the Earth’s rotation so they can relay data and surveil the same specific locations on the Earth throughout a 24-hour period.

The National Air and Space Agency, or NASA, explains that there are essentially four types of circular Earth orbits (remain the same distance from the Earth throughout the orbital path) defined by distance from the Earth and whether the orbit is in synch with the Earth: high Earth orbit (HEO), medium Earth orbit (MEO), low Earth orbit (LEO), and geosynchronous Earth orbit (GEO). Many weather and communications satellites tend to have a high Earth orbit, due to their ability to track weather patterns across a wider swath of the Earth. Because of their significant distance from Earth, they are not optimized for most communications applications, such as relaying internet signals.

According to NASA Earth Observatory, satellites that orbit in a medium (mid) Earth orbit include
navigation and specialty satellites, designed to monitor a particular region. Also, most scientific satellites have a low Earth orbit due to their ability to revisit a location on the Earth to collect changing data points much faster than a slower-moving satellite in a higher orbit (NASA Earth Observatory, n.d., link). Customers with a weather system and threat monitoring and detection mission would require consistent coverage of a specific area of the Earth. If this is the collection focus, then a satellite sensor in a geosynchronous Earth orbit would be best. GEO satellites are in sync with the Earth's rotation, so they are achieving a persistent stare as it is called, over a region of the Earth.

Other special orbits include sun-synchronous orbits, highly inclined orbits, and highly elliptical orbits. Like geosynchronous Earth orbits, sun-synchronous means that the satellite is in sync with the Earth, but in this case, the satellite is in sync with the Earth's rotation around the sun. Therefore, the satellite is always performing its sensing mission during daylight. This is especially important if the sensors are electro-optical sensors that rely on passively collecting the sun's energy to produce grayscale, spectral, or full-color images or video.

Satellites in a highly elliptical orbit, are launched in an orbit that brings them very close to the Earth at one end of the elliptical orbit, and very far from the Earth, as they move to their highest point in an elliptical path. They can collect information and signals from a very wide area and also collect at high resolution when they are very close to the Earth. These satellite sensors can achieve a drastically different resolution and imaging capability depending on how close or far they are from the Earth's surface. Intelligence customers may need this increased coverage or resolution and would opt for satellites in a highly elliptical orbit to augment their collection from satellites in HEO, GEO, or MEO orbits.

Demand from the U.S. intelligence community and businesses for individuals who understand remote sensing operations is experiencing lift-off. Find out how you can expand your collection and meet the demands of so many challenging missions.
CACI Secures $382M US Army Signals Intelligence and EW Systems Contract

CACI International Inc. recently announced approval for a five-year award (up to $382 million) to provide SIGINT/EW technology to the U.S. Army Combat Capabilities Development Command (DEVCOM) Engineering and Systems Integration Directorate (ESID) Trojan Engineering and Systems Integration (ESI) Advancement of Trojan Systems (EATS). CACI will prioritize software development and maintenance for the Trojan family of systems across the Army military intelligence enterprise at all intelligence collection units. CACI

DNI Avril Haines Briefs 2024 Annual Threat Assessment to Senate Intelligence Committee

Director of National Intelligence, Honorable Avril Haines, and IC leaders at the DIA, CIA, and FBI recently testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence their 2024 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community regarding the current global threat impacting U.S. national security. Leaders presented growing concerns about an "increasingly fragile world order", where national powers in China, Russia, and Iran are experiencing instability in the respective nations due to various regional conflicts weakening their standings in competition for global influence. CSIS

IC Leaders Make Plans to Centralize OSINT

DNI Avril Haines and CIA Director William Burns recently discussed new strategies to bring OSINT operations and capabilities to the forefront, stating that “the explosion of public and commercial data available over the internet... [and] the ability to organize and analyze that information using technology like AI” ensures the need to create more effective safeguards for OSINT analysis, reporting, and intelligence sharing throughout the IC. Federal News Network
Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community

Discover our threats · Think critically · Protect Lives

Learn More
Confirm Your Assigned Academic Advisor
Whether you’re a newly admitted student or a continuing student, it is important to know who you can contact for support. Continuing students, your Academic Advisor may have changed from who you worked with in previous semesters. To check who is listed as your assigned advisor, follow the steps below!

1. Log into your Student Center portal on the UAccess webpage.
2. Click on the Advising menu option towards the top of the page and select “View Advisors”, or follow the links below to find your appropriate Advisor.

3. You will see the name of your current advisor, their contact information, and a link to schedule an appointment.

Confirm Your Enrollment
Please log into your UAccess Student Center and confirm your enrollment for Spring 2024. If you have holds you are unsure about, questions about the courses you’re enrolled in or if you are not currently enrolled, reach out to your Advisor.

Please feel free to contact our main number at 520-621-8219 and email address at CASTAdvising@arizona.edu
# COURSE SCHEDULE

## FALL 2024

### SEVEN WEEK - FIRST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAT#</th>
<th>COURSE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CYBV354*</td>
<td>Principles of Open Source Intelligence</td>
<td>TBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>CYBV437*</td>
<td>Deception, Counter-Deception &amp; Counterintelligence</td>
<td>Benson, Michael</td>
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<tr>
<td>CYBV440*</td>
<td>Digital Espionage</td>
<td>Cota, Casey</td>
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<tr>
<td>CYBV450*</td>
<td>Information Warfare</td>
<td>Benson, Michael</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTV305</td>
<td>Introduction to IIO</td>
<td>Allen, Brent</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTV326</td>
<td>Introductory Methods of Intelligence Analysis</td>
<td>Tortorici, Patrick</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTV350</td>
<td>Intelligence Collection</td>
<td>Nazareth, Craig</td>
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<td>INTV353</td>
<td>Geospatial Intelligence</td>
<td>Zsambok, Billy</td>
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<td>INTV377</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
<td>Hilliard, Christopher</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTV459</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Synchronization</td>
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### SEVEN WEEK - SECOND

<table>
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<tr>
<td>CYBV351*</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare</td>
<td>Cota, Casey</td>
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<td>Principles of Open Source Intelligence</td>
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<td>Benson, Michael</td>
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<td>INTV401</td>
<td>Introduction to Law</td>
<td>Tortorici, Patrick</td>
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<td>INTV455</td>
<td>Target-Centric Analysis</td>
<td>Nazareth, Craig</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTV459</td>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Synchronization</td>
<td>Wisecup, Tyler</td>
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### 15 WEEK

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTV498</td>
<td>Senior Capstone in IIO</td>
<td>Hilliard, Christopher</td>
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INTV 305
Introduction to Intelligence and Information Operations
Fall 2024, Seven Week – First & Second
Provides a broad overview of the American intelligence systems – collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert operations – and demonstrates how these systems work together to provide a “decision advantage” for policymakers. Students will also learn how U.S. adversaries have shifted away from directly challenging American forces and have moved to a less risky hybrid warfare model to achieve their tactical and strategic goals. Students will use a combination of research and critical thinking exercises to gain an understanding of the importance of how intelligence is used to inform the decision-making process. Students will also learn how to detect and guard against adversarial information operations designed to manipulate their own sources.

INTV 326
Introductory Methods of Intelligence Analysis
Fall 2024, Seven Week – First & Second
Provides students with an introduction to Intelligence Analysis and instruction on how to research national security topics and incorporate tradecraft, including critical thinking and structured analytic techniques, to challenge judgments, identify mental mindsets, stimulate creativity and manage uncertainty within the framework of providing sound assessments to decision-makers at the Strategic, Operational and Tactical level of war. Students will leverage scenario-based exercises to practice employing structured analytical techniques and other analytical methodologies in order to answer a decision maker’s critical information requirements.
INTV 350

Intelligence Collection

Fall 2024, Seven Week – First & Second

This course provides students with an overview of the five U.S. intelligence Community recognized intelligence disciplines (Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT), and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) to understand how to employ collection to answer information and intelligence requirements into the capabilities, limitations and applications of sensors, and discern the functional responsibilities between intelligence analysts, collection managers and decision makers across the national security enterprise.

INTV 353

Introductory Methods of Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)

Fall 2024, Seven Week - First

This course provides students with an introduction to GEOINT operations and how intelligence professionals can incorporate tradecraft and technology to present visual depictions of critical information regarding enemy forces, and terrain, and provide combat operations support to decision-makers and operations planners. This course studies the electromagnetic spectrum and fundamentals of energy propagation as they pertain to GEOINT systems and phenomenology. Students will be introduced to the tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination of GEOINT systems and data, and GEOINT contributions to National Security, Homeland Security, and Strategic Partnerships. This fundamental knowledge may be applied to a diverse range of constantly evolving GEOINT efforts including support to disaster relief, force protection, and combat operations.
INTV 377
Psychological Operations
Fall 2024, Seven Week - First
This course is an introduction to the capabilities and uses of psychological operations. Students will examine psychological operations capabilities, limitations, history, and challenges. As part of their learning experience, students will establish when psychological operations are appropriate, how to know when they have become the target of an effort to manipulate their behavior, and how to mitigate its effects and plan a psychological operation against a notional target. Enrollment Requirements: Students enrolled in fully online programs only.

INTV 401
Introduction to Law Enforcement Intelligence
Fall 2024, Seven Week - Second
This course provides students the opportunity to explore the integration of intelligence-led policing with community-based policing and problem-oriented policing. The focus will be placed on educating students on the process of developing raw information into actionable intelligence, thereby allowing field officers to be more effective during routine law enforcement functions. Students will also learn the intelligence principles that exist within the daily operations of law enforcement.
INTV 455
Target-Centric Analysis
Fall 2024, Seven Week - Second
This course provides students with an in-depth analysis of the intelligence process; methodologies for evaluating data; threat modeling; and a process to evaluate the needs of the Intelligence consumer. Students will utilize practical analysis exercises to become familiar with threat modeling, the estimative process, and Intelligence reporting techniques to answer a decision maker's critical information requirements.

INTV 459
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance & Synchronization
Fall 2024, Seven Week - First & Second
This course provides an in-depth examination of how to optimize the coordination of all available collection capabilities to support intelligence operations and the military decision-making process. Students will conduct research and engage in practical exercises to determine optimal sensor deployment schemes and sensor-to-target mix to address different collection requirements.

INTV 498
Senior Capstone in Intelligence and Information Operations
Spring 2024, 15 Week
This course provides Intelligence & Information Operations majors with a capstone experience emphasizing the integration of knowledge acquired in previous courses. The course provides a culminating experience for majors involving a substantive project that demonstrates a synthesis of learning accumulated in the major, including broadly comprehensive knowledge of the discipline and its methodologies. Students are required to incorporate a field research study into their research project. This is a self-directed course in which students develop and produce a senior-level research paper grounded in relevant research.
CYBV 351
Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
Spring 2024, Seven Week - Second
CYBV 351 is an elective course that will provide students with an in-depth look at Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Electronic Warfare (EW) from a strategic, operational, tactical, and technological aspect, including the role of electromagnetic energy in SIGINT and EW operations. Students will use a combination of assessments, research, and practical exercises to gain a holistic view of SIGINT and EW applications in the National Intelligence Enterprise.

CYBV 354
Principles of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
Spring 2024, Seven Week – First & Second
CYBV 354 provides students with an overview of the fundamentals of Open Source Intelligence. Students will be presented with the most effective methodologies used by cyber professionals, law enforcement, and other investigative personnel to locate and analyze information on the Internet and Dark Web. Students will use interactive exercises to become familiar with the volume of sensitive data on the Internet and how it can be exploited to develop highly detailed intelligence products.
CYBV 437
Deception, Counter-Deception & Counter-Intelligence
Fall 2024, Seven Week - First
CYBV 437 will provide students with an introduction to the concepts of deception, counter-deception, counterintelligence, and psychological operations. A survey of how these concepts are used in adversarial Information Operations and why they are among the most effective mechanisms to sway public opinion will be presented. Students will use interactive exercises to become familiar with how to detect deception campaigns as well as the mitigation strategies to defend against them.

CYBV 440
Digital Espionage
Fall 2024, Seven Week - First
CYBV 440 teaches students about the theft of state secrets for political or economic reasons. It will provide students with a comprehensive overview of the concepts, tactics, and techniques adversaries use to steal secrets. Students will analyze case studies to become familiar with how to detect, identify, and mitigate digital espionage operations and the actors who conduct them.

CYBV 450
Information Warfare
Fall 2024, Seven Week – First & Second
CYBV 450 will provide students with an in-depth overview of the tactics, techniques, procedures, and tools used to conduct and defend against Information Operation campaigns. Students will analyze case studies involving nation-state actors' online influence efforts to detect, deconstruct, and counter adversarial Information Operation campaigns.
**Do the Math.**
Test your analytical skills. Fill in the numeric values based on the information given.

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United States Intelligence Community
Internship Opportunities for Students
To learn more, visit www.IntelligenceCareers.gov/ICStudents.html or individual IC element websites linked below

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
www.nro.gov/careers/
• Application open until July 24th, 2022 with selections typically made by October
• Paid undergraduate and graduate internship programs for summer 2023
Specific programs of interest include:
• STEM
• Economics
• Political Science
• Business Administration
• Human Resources
• Physical Science
• Data Science

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
https://www.dia.mil/Careers-Opportunities/Students/
• Application opens and closes at various times, typically in March the year before your internship begins
• Paid undergraduate & graduate internship programs for summer 2024
Specific programs of interest include:
• Political Science
• Global Studies
• Computer Science
• Business
• Human Resources
• Law/Criminal Justice
• Natural Sciences
• Engineering
• Logistics

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
• Application open from July 2022 to August 2022
• Paid undergraduate and graduate internship programs for summer 2023
Specific programs of interest include:
• Intelligence Analysis
• Health/Science
• Law Enforcement
• Technology Emergency Management
• Cybersecurity
• Public Affairs Management/Support

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
www.oni.navy.mil/Careers/Intern-Programs/
• Application open from September 2022 to October 2022
• Paid undergraduate and graduate internship programs for summer 2024

AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE
https://afcivilianscareers.com/paq-intel/
• Applications are currently being accepted and are accepted at various times during the year.
• Paid undergraduate and graduate 3-year internship
Specific programs of interest include:
• STEM
• Computer Science
• Foreign Language
• Logistics
• Cyber Security
• Intelligence Analysis
• Management
• Human Resources
• Strategic
• Communications

An internship in the intelligence Community (IC) is a great experience that can help launch your career path. Many of the opportunities highlighted here are for summer internships, but some IC elements offer internships during the academic year or that could span many years. Upon graduation and successful completion, some internships lead to non-competitive conversion to full-time employment.
United States Intelligence Community
Internship Opportunities for Students
To learn more, visit www.IntelligenceCareers.gov/ICStudents.html or individual IC element websites linked below

**Virtual Student Federal Service (VSFS)**
https://vsfs.state.gov/apply
- Apply in July 2022 for an internship during the upcoming academic year
- VSFS is an unpaid, remote internship which requires no security clearance

**The Presidential Management Fellowship (PMF)**
www.pmf.gov
- The application is open from 13 September until 27 September
- Only graduate students (MA, PhD, JD, MBA, etc.) who graduated between September 13, 2022, and September 13, 2023, or will graduate before August 31, 2023, may apply.
- Selected PMFs will have the opportunity to apply to positions across the federal government, including within the IC

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**
https://careers.state.gov/interns-fellows/student-internships/
- Application opens in the fall on USA Jobs (typically opens and closes in September)
- Paid undergraduate and graduate internship for summer 2023
- Positions in many bureaus, including the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)

**Specific programs of interest include:**
- **Student Internship Program**: opportunities to work in U.S. Embassies and Consulates throughout the world
- **Pathways Internship Program**: opportunities to explore federal careers
- **Numerous Fellowship Programs**
- **Workforce Recruitment Program for disabled persons**

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**
https://www.cia.gov/careers/student-programs/
- Applications accepted year-round for most programs: apply one year before preferred start date
- Paid undergraduate and graduate internship programs

**Specific programs of interest include:**
- Political Science
- Data Science
- International Relations
- STEM
- Education/Training
- Media Analysis
- Graphic Design
- Economics
- Cyber Security
- Cartography
- Information Management
- Computer Science
- Human Resources
- Library Science

**NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTTELLIGENCE AGENCY**
https://www.intelligencecareers.gov/NGA/ngastudentprograms.html
- Application closes in September 2022
- Paid undergraduate and graduate internship programs for summer 2023
- Positions based in Virginia & Missouri

**Specific programs of interest include:**
- **Business**
- **Geophysics**
- **Human Resources**
- **Earth Sciences**
- **Intelligence**
- **Analysis**
- **Finance**
- **Computer Science**
- **STEM**
- **Geography**
- **Social Sciences**

**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
www.fbijobs.gov/students
- Application opens in September 2022
- Paid undergraduate and graduate internship programs for summer 2023
- Internships offered in Washington DC as well as at many of the FBI’s field offices across the country

**Specific programs of interest include:**
- **Honors Internship Program**
- **Visiting Scientist Program**
The Department of Energy

www.energy.gov/careers/student-recent-graduates

Three internship programs of interest:
- Minority Educational Institution Student Partnership Program (MEISSPP): Typically apply by March for a paid internship. Learn More.
- DOE Scholars Program: Typically apply by September for this internship with opportunities around the country as well as a stipend. Learn More.
- National Nuclear Security Administration Graduate Fellowship Program (NGFP): Apply by Early October 2022 for this paid opportunity. Learn More.

U.S. Army Cyber Command

https://bit.ly/3nU0JEw

- Applications are currently being accepted and are accepted at various times during the year.
- Apply for paid positions over the summer or for 2-year fellowship opportunities
- Positions located at Fort Gordon, Georgia

Tips on Securing an Internship

1. Read the eligibility requirements before applying to ensure that you are eligible for the internship.
2. Write a federal resume. Work with your university career office and your IC CAE Program to understand the content required for a top-tier federal resume.
3. If an application requires a cover letter, tailor it to the position. This is your opportunity to connect your education and unique experience and skills to the position.
4. Be proactive and move quickly. Check often for internship openings as some agencies cap the number of applications they will accept.
5. A background investigation is typically required and some agencies also require a medical exam, foreign language, and/or military service.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Internship Program seeks high performing University of Arizona students in the Intelligence Information and Operations (IIO) program to support the Southern Border Intelligence Center (SBIC).

Students will assist the Executive Director to coordinate meetings, compile deliverables, engage with other senior leaders across the southern border, and conduct tasks as needed. This position will provide the selected candidate(s) the opportunity to participate in intelligence planning at the strategic and operational level across the U.S. Government.
Purpose of the Internship:
As an all-source intelligence analyst, applicants will learn how to conduct research, form analytical conclusions, key judgements, and perform a variety of analytical techniques to answer key intelligence questions. Interns will learn the intelligence cycle, Intelligence Community Standards, a variety of analytical techniques, and an understanding of the complex border security environment.

Internship Available: Summer – Yes  Fall – Yes  Spring – Yes

Deadlines: Applications must be received by the first week of the previous semester, i.e. for and internship starting in the Spring semester, submit application within the first week of the previous Fall semester.

Agency Minimum Qualifications:
- You must be a U.S. Citizen to apply for this position
- Males born after 12/31/1959 must be registered with Selective Service
- Primary U.S. residency for at least three of the last five years
- Background Investigation: CBP is a federal law enforcement agency that requires all applicants to undergo a thorough background investigation prior to employment in order to promote the agency's core values of vigilance, service to country, and integrity. During the screening and/or background investigation process, you will be asked questions regarding any felony criminal convictions or current felony charges, the use of illegal drugs (e.g., marijuana, cocaine, heroin, LSD, methamphetamines, ecstasy), and the use of non-prescribed controlled substances including any experimentation, possession, sale, receipt, manufacture, cultivation, production, transfer, shipping, trafficking, or distribution of controlled substances. For more information visit this link.

Agency Preferred Qualifications:
- Current University of Arizona Student within good standing, minimum of a 3.0 GPA.
- Students in their 2nd or 3rd year of study in an Intelligence, Criminal Justice, or National Security related field

Internship Description: Unpaid (Potential to earn college units/credits)
- Providing support to senior leadership that informs and enhances their ability to make strategic decisions;
- Providing support to senior level engagements on a variety of intelligence programs and activities;
- Providing assistance with management of intra-office relationships across multiple intelligence organizations.

To Apply:
Please submit a resume, school transcript, and a writing sample (2-5 pages) to lillian.abril@cbp.dhs.gov.

Expected Contact:
We will contact you within 3-5 business days upon receiving your application by email to set up an in-person interview.
The Directorate of Analysis offers fellowships for undergraduate and graduate students attending four-year Minority Serving Institutions (MSIs). As an Intelligence Analyst Intern for CIA, you will work on teams alongside full-time analysts, studying and evaluating information from all available sources—classified and unclassified—and then analyzing it to provide timely and objective assessments to customers such as the President, National Security Council, and other U.S. policymakers.

**Application Deadline:** 6-12 months before the intended start date. Learn more about the program [here](#).
IC agencies and industry partners are looking for future intelligence professionals like you! Below are current positions currently offered in IIO fields. For more job listings, please look at the job search engines on the Career Resources page.

**Criminal Intelligence Analyst**  
Arizona Department of Public Safety  
Job Location: Denver/Aurora, CO || Fort George G. Meade Complex, MD  
Pay Plan: NA  
[Job Posting](#)

**State Trooper Cadet**  
Arizona Department of Public Safety  
Job Location: Phoenix, AZ  
Pay Plan: NA  
Open: Rotating  
[Job Posting](#)

**OIC Intelligence Analyst**  
Allied Universal  
Job Location: Scottsdale, AZ  
Pay Plan: NA  
Open: 2024-04-26 – 2024-06-09  
[Job Posting](#)

**Special Agent**  
Federal Bureau of Investigations  
Job Location: Multiple Locations  
Pay Plan: N/A  
Open: Rotating  
[Job Posting](#)

**Security Operations Center - GSOC Analyst**  
Location: Chandler, AZ  
Pay Plan: N/A  
Open: Open rotation  
[Job Posting](#)

**Intelligence Specialist (ICD)**  
U.S. Army Futures Command  
Location: Fort Huachuca, AZ  
Pay Plan: NA  
Open: 2024-04-25 – TBD  
[Job Posting](#)

**Junior Counterintelligence (CISS) Screener**  
Bizzell Corporation  
Job Location: Sierra Vista, AZ  
Pay Plan: NA  
[Job Posting](#)
Industry employers partners, contractors, federal agencies are looking for the best job candidates to fill a number of critical positions in the Intelligence Community.

**U.S. Intelligence Careers**

Great resource to research jobs throughout the Intelligence Community seeking various intelligence and information analysis skills. You can also find the latest scholarships and internships offered year-round.

> intelligencecareers.gov

**USAJOBS**

Widely known and respected job search tool. Find job listings with various government sectors in and out of the Intelligence Community. In addition, this site offers the ability to draft both federal and standard resumes through its internal resume builder.

> usajobs.gov

**Indeed**

One of the most trusted job search engines in nation! You will be able to find a number of job postings that serve many sectors of the intelligence industry. Indeed also offers a resume uploader where you can store your pre-produced resume for easy application submissions.

> indeed.com

**LinkedIn**

One of the most effective ways to find employment is through your professional network. LinkedIn has become the industry standard social platform to connect professionals with industry leaders and hiring managers. Create your profile, engage and communicate with colleagues and recruiters, and plan your new future today!

> https://www.linkedin.com

**Clearancejobs/Clearedjobs.net**

Both sites offer pathways to employment for those students that currently hold an active or current security clearance. Most jobs listed are for federal and contract positions. Create and account and search these offerings.

> clearancejobs.com
> clearedjobs.net

**Puzzle Answers**

Phrase: "Great art picks up where nature ends." – Marc Chagall
Handshake
Talent, Meet Opportunity.

Get hired. Apply for jobs and internships offered on campus, in your local area or across the nation.

Get discovered. Stand out among your peers to reach employers actively recruiting Wildcat candidates.

Get connected. Build social networks with peers for tips to land your desired job or internship.

Get involved and make an impact. Discover on-campus and virtual career-focused training events.

arizona.joinhandshake.com
login with your NetID and password
WE WANT YOU FOR THE SOC

Join the UofA’s Security Operations Center today for a rewarding, for credit, cybersecurity intern experience!

What Will You Do As A SOC Intern?

INVESTIGATION
- Review vulnerability data
- And record and track IT security incidents, including:
  - Compromised Accounts
  - Phishing
  - Abuse reports

CORE OF THE INTERNSHIP

OPERATIONS
- Get hands-on experience with security tools and practices within a professional business environment:
  - SIEM
  - IPS
  - Netflow

EXPERIENCE THE SOC WORKFLOW

HUNTING
- Perform threat hunting to detect and eradicate threats using various paid and open source intelligence tools!

LEARN AND USE OSINT SKILLS

This internship is available to be taken for credit with advisor approval and provides opportunities to develop your skills as a professional in the industry.

Interested? Apply Now On Handshake:
https://app.joinhandshake.com/emp/jobs/8260025

MINIMUM Qualifications
- Located in Tucson, Arizona
- Access to reliable internet connection and computing resources
- Internship is available for credit — with advisor approval
- 15-25 hours per week
  - Mon-Fri || 9a -> 5p
- Must be a current UofA student studying Cyber Operations, Computer Science, or related degree

&

PREFERRED Experience
- The Incident Handling Process
- Networking (TCP/IP, UDP, DNS, DHCP, HTTP, etc.)
- Security technologies and concepts (Firewalls, Network Intrusion Detection systems, SIEM, CIA Triad)
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework
- Common data analysis tools and techniques
- Understanding of Information Security best practices at an individual and/or organizational level

Questions or concerns?
Email: security@arizona.edu

Information Security
Beliefs, values, and attitudes can be subject to levels of bias. In terms of cognitive dissonance, bias occurs when one experiences discomfort that causes them to either reject, discard, or simply avoid any information that conflicts with strongly held beliefs. Intelligence analysts are tasked to develop various intelligence products with assessments of national targets with unique sets of geopolitical, military, and government identities that may culturally operate in ways antithetical to the analyst’s beliefs and values. Cognitive dissonance can affect the analyst’s ability to rationalize or avoid information that contradicts their existing beliefs or assessments. This bias can lead to selective perception, interpretation, and memory of information, ultimately comprising the objectivity and accuracy of intelligence assessments.

Intelligence analysts can mitigate instances of cognitive dissonance by:

**Be the devil’s advocate:** Analysts should be encouraged to challenge their assessments and assumptions through the course of their analysis and reporting processes.

**Let data guide your analysis:** Evidence-based analysis provides more objectivity to your assessments rather than assessments that are guided by preconceived notions and subjective or educated opinions.

**Use structured analytic techniques (SATs):** SATs like Red-Teaming or Devil’s Advocacy provide ways for analysts to think critically within the process of intelligence analysis, also challenging assumptions and mitigating other instances of bias.